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Abstract
Can normative arguments for a governance of environ-
mental migration succeed? The present analysis applies 
constructivist theories on norm entrepreneurship to the 
debate on the governance of environmental migration . 
Throughout the analysis, it appears that “environmental 
migration” is not constructed by one single, coherent norm 
entrepreneur . Rather, one may distinguish four normative 
enterprises that compete to use similar notions in the pur-
suit of divergent goals . They frame the issue of “environ-
mental migration,” alternatively, as one of humanitarian 
assistance, forced migration, environmental sustainability, 
or international security . The article analyzes the prospect 
of each individual normative enterprise and their inter-
actions . It concludes that norm entrepreneurs elaborating 
on a language of international security will likely have 
the greatest impact on the governance of environmental 
migration . Other normative enterprises are already per-
meated by the dominant language of fears . 
Résumé
L’argument normatif quant à une gouvernance des migra-
tions environnementales peut-il convaincre ? Cet article 
propose une analyse de la gouvernance des migrations 
environnementales basée sur la théorie constructiviste de 
l’« entreprise normative » . Au travers de cette analyse, il 
apparaît que les « migrations environnementales » ne sont 
pas le fruit d’un seul acteur, mais plutôt de quatre groupes 
de pression distincts . Ces groupes de pression définissent 
le problème des « migrations environnementales », alter-
nativement, comme un problème d’assistance humanitaire, 
de migrations forcées, de protection de l’environnement, 
ou de sécurité internationale . Cet article conclue que les 
entrepreneurs normatifs qui s’appuient sur le concept de 
sécurité internationale sont sans doute ceux qui auront le 
plus grand impact sur la gouvernance des migrations envi-
ronnementales . Les autres entreprises normatives ont déjà 
commencé à céder la voie au discours sécuritaire dominant .
There is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so . 
—Hamlet, 2 .2
Introduction 
The great causes of humanity are defined through a socio-
historical process of argumentation. Of late, it has become 
common to plead for specific efforts in relation to “environ-
mental migration,” in particular through international 
norms. The promoters of these normative arguments are not 
only academics,1 but also NGOs,2 international organiza-
tions,3 and (more and more) states.4 Yet the debate has cen-
tred on the ends that one should strive for, and less on the 
ways to achieve them, despite the saying that “a goal without 
a plan is just a wish.”5 For the ethical arguments at stake 
to become something more than a wish, it is necessary to 
develop pragmatic research that would identify which argu-
mentative strategies work, which do not work, and which 
are counter-productive—that is, an argumentative plan.
This article is a modest attempt at sparking a cold analysis 
within this debate. Such a cold analysis would map the dis-
cursive arena by indicating the destinations that advocates 
would likely reach if they opted for a specific argumentative 
route, the perils that they would face en route, and perhaps 
the shortcuts that they could take to reach their destination 
in time.
For that purpose, this article is inspired by the “con-
structivist turn” of international relations studies, which 
demonstrated that, in the pursuit of international relations, 
“social construction matters.”6 The constructivist perspec-
tive is thus an attempt at introducing Derrida’s notion of 
27
Volume 29 Refuge Number 2
deconstruction into the analysis of international relations, 
often along with Habermas’s theory of communicative 
action.7 In particular, this article makes use of a theoretical 
framework on norm entrepreneurship developed during 
the late 1990s and early 2000s.
The discussion is structured as follows. The first sec-
tion reviews the constructivist literature, with a focus on 
theories on norm entrepreneurship.  The second section 
analyzes how the issue of “environmental migration” has 
been framed. The third section discusses the individual 
prospects of four different normative enterprises. The last 
section questions the interactions among these normative 
enterprises.
Constructivism has developed through analytical 
studies on historical examples. In retrospect, there is an 
unavoidable tendency to elude unsuccessful arguments and 
to “flatten” successful ones. Unsurprisingly, things appear 
considerably murkier, sometimes undecipherable, when 
the same theories are applied prospectively to arguments 
in the making. In particular, complications result from the 
existence of competing normative enterprises that approach 
“environmental migration” in different ways and suggest 
diverging responses.
How Do New Norms Emerge?
At the end of the 1990s, the constructivist literature had 
reconceptualized norms, not as a given, but rather as the 
outcome of a social interaction—a process of transforming 
a mere possibility into a “should be” and finally into an 
“is.”8 For Ian Johnstone, norms “shape through interaction 
within and between states, and in a transnational process 
that involves representatives of NGOs, the private sec-
tor, and officials of international organizations, as well as 
states.”9
Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink developed a 
theory of the “life cycle” of norms, constituting of three 
phases: “emergence,” “cascade,” and “internalization.”10 
Each of these steps is supported by a distinct social process 
involving different actors. Firstly, “norm entrepreneurs with 
organizational platforms” gain the support of critical states, 
thus allowing the emergence of norms on global agendas. 
Secondly, “states, international organizations [and] net-
works” rally norm-breakers through “socialization, insti-
tutionalization [and] demonstration.” Finally, “law, profes-
sions,” and “bureaucracies” internalize the norms as habits: 
a new norm is born.11
Johnstone defines the “norm entrepreneurs” as “actors 
with a cause who mobilize support for that cause and seek 
to have it crystallized as an accepted standard of behav-
iour.”12 They can be relatively powerful leaders, head of 
states, or UN secretaries general, or influential advocates 
such as Henri Dunant.13 If individual qualities are certainly 
a must, Finnemore and Sikkink insist that “all norm pro-
moters at the international level need some kind of organ-
izational platform from and through which they promote 
their norms.”14 These organizational platforms can consist 
of NGOs,15 intergovernmental organizations,16 or states.17 
However, some authors conceive of institutional “norm 
entrepreneurs” such as states, the EU, or international 
organizations.18
Because norm entrepreneurship is essentially an attempt 
of the relatively powerless to affect the more powerful, 
norm entrepreneurs cannot use force: arguments are their 
only means. The analysis of norm entrepreneurship relates 
closely to communication studies, in particular in the work 
of Risse and Crawford.19 Risse argues that social action can-
not be understood through a pure “logic of appropriateness”; 
rather, a “logic of truth seeking and arguing” should also 
be part of the picture. Accordingly, “arguing constitutes a 
learning mechanism by which actors acquire new informa-
tion, evaluate their interests in light of new empirical and 
moral knowledge, and—most importantly—can reflexively 
and collectively assess the validity claims of norms and 
standards of appropriate behaviour.”20
Crawford adopts a broader conception of an “argu-
ment.” Risse—highly influenced by Habermas’s theory of 
communicative action—understands the logic of arguing 
as a rational process through which truth tends to emerge. 
Crawford’s reception of Habermas is more cautious. For her, 
an argument is “an effort to persuade others to see the world 
in a particular way and to act in accordance with the con-
clusion that follows from the argument.”21 This already sug-
gests that an argument does not need to be purely rational, 
as an argument is accordingly defined by its end rather than 
by its form. Crawford sketches a typology of arguments 
that distinguishes “practical,” “scientific,” “identity,” and 
“ethical” arguments, but she also identifies the underlying 
“meta arguments … about whether we should have an argu-
ment and what that argument should be about.”22 
Identifying “meta-arguments” allows Crawford to 
explain the limits of argument: up to where actors are ready 
to be convinced. Evidently, international relations are not 
fully comprehended within the ambit of language ethics. 
Habermas’s theory of communicative action roams the 
constructivist turn in international relations studies, yet 
this theory is not always the appropriate method of analy-
sis—one may even argue that Habermas meant to develop 
a normative rather than a descriptive theory.23 Arguments 
often depend not only on their internal validity as revealed 
by the discourse, but also on extrinsic elements such as the 
mere readiness of the (potential) interlocutors to be per-
suaded. Risse recognizes the issue of a limited openness to 
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persuasion. He distinguishes between three communicative 
behaviours: (1) “bargaining on the basis of fixed preferences,” 
limited to “exchanging information about preferences, 
making promises, or threatening”; (2) “rhetorical action” 
supposing the strategic use of arguments to convince the 
other but with little willingness to change one’s own opin-
ion; and (3) “true reasoning” resulting from a “behavior 
oriented toward reaching a common understanding” where 
Habermas’s theory on communicative action applies fully.24 
However, Risse does not explain why actors opt for one or 
another communicative behaviour. Crawford prefers to 
consider a continuum of communicative settings that situ-
ate an actor’s behaviour in a conception of “social action” as 
“complex, consisting of communication, reflection, decision, 
and coordination with others.” The continuum extends 
from circumstances where “there is no argument (killing 
and compulsion)” to circumstances where “there is only 
argument (discourse ethics).”25
Thus, this theoretical framework also hints at psycho-
logical studies on how decisions are made, in particular on 
the influence of emotional affects. Such works oppose the 
“rational processing system,” which is “analytical, logical 
and deliberative” and “encodes reality in abstract symbols, 
worlds and numbers,” to the “experiential system,” “hol-
istic, affective and intuitive,” which “encodes reality in 
concrete images, metaphors and narratives linked in asso-
ciative networks.”26 In particular, Epstein highlights the 
point that “experientially derived knowledge is often more 
compelling and more likely to influence behavior than is 
abstract knowledge.”27 Reflecting such psychological stud-
ies, constructivist authors have denounced the assumption 
of a cold rationality of the actors. In particular, Finnemore 
and Sikkink note that “politics without passion … is hardly 
the politics of the world in which we live.” They emphasize 
the need to “pay … more attention to studies in psychology, 
particularly work on the roles of affect, empathy, conform-
ity, and esteem.”28
It is precisely in this direction that Crawford turns. 
Reverting to Aristotle, she considers Homo politicus as “a 
reasoning actor, not a rational one.”29 She submits that 
“argument and persuasion are characterized by emotion 
and normative concerns as well as by rational or logical 
process.”30 Therefore, she extends the scope of argument to 
emotions, both as “barriers and openings to arguments”:31 
it is because of their emotions that actors are receptive to 
arguments. Thus, according to Crawford, “actors make their 
choice about what mode of action to pursue—say the choice 
between strategic action (coercion or killing) and delibera-
tion—based on their emotional relationship with the other 
and their sense of what is normatively right in a particu-
lar setting.”32 Because emotions contribute to defining the 
actors’ communicative behaviour, so, too, do spontaneous 
moral conceptions (as opposed to reasoned ethics): “Actors 
judge a good argument not just by its practicality and truth 
value, but by what we consider is normatively right and how 
following it would make us feel.”33
Beyond emotions, another finding of the construc-
tivist literature is the importance of culture. Both Risse 
and Crawford highlight the role of a common cultural 
background as a condition for argument, referring to 
Plato’s “enchantment,” Foucault’s “governmentality,” and 
Habermas’s “common lifeworld” quite interchangeably: 
“Without language and taken for granted beliefs we could 
not have coherent arguments.”34 As culture extends, life-
world limits the scope for arguments: more is taken for 
granted and less is open to discussion. Yet, through meta-
arguments, lifeworld “can be problematized or denormal-
ized and hence opened up to arguments and persuasion.”35 
Crawford notes, however, that international relations 
remain highly under-institutionalized when compared with 
an ideal-typical nation-state with high cultural integration. 
Despite the existence of international “deliberative institu-
tions,” she notes, “lifeworlds are thicker in regions … and 
arguments across lifeworlds are often incomprehensible or 
plagued with misunderstanding.”36 
Beyond rationality, emotions, and culture, construc-
tivists recognize that “some domestic norms appear more 
likely candidates for internationalization than others.”37 
This is because structural elements affect the reception of 
arguments. Hinting at communication studies, Finnemore 
and Sikkink argue that the success of an argument depends 
on the capacity of norm entrepreneurs to frame it within 
an efficient message: arguments that are “clear and specific, 
rather than ambiguous and complex” may have more 
chance of being understood and accepted.38 For Crawford, 
who speaks matters as well, especially with regard to the 
different “emotional relationships” (e.g., trust, empathy or 
“extreme fear”) woven with different potential norm entre-
preneurs.39 Furthermore, constructivist studies suggest that 
the substance of the argument also influences its prospects—
positively if the argument participates in “a long-term trend 
toward humanizing the ‘other,’ or ‘moral progress.’”40 
Lastly, material interests matter too, as well as actors’ know-
ledge of their interests: Risse shows that “the more actors 
are uncertain about their interests and even identities,” the 
more arguing processes are likely to occur.41 With an opti-
mistic view, Finnemore and Sikkink highlight the import-
ance of the “use of expertise and information to change the 
behavior of other actors” and the “support of state actors to 
endorse their norms and make norm socialization a part of 
their agenda.”42 One may, however, imagine circumstances 
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where a veil of ignorance facilitates a consensus or, at least, 
a fair consensus.
Framing “Environmental Migration” as an Issue
Alarmists versus Skeptics
The debate on climate migration has often been conceived 
as the continuous opposition of two schools of thought 
with different disciplinary backgrounds.43 On the one 
hand, the “maximalist” or “alarmist” school, dominated by 
environmental scholars, has prospered through the release 
of adventurous estimates and predictions of the numbers 
of “environmental refugees.”44 On the other hand, the 
“minimalist” or “skeptical” school (indeed a critique of the 
former), led by migration experts, highlighted the complex 
ways through which environmental change may induce, 
or prevent, different forms of migrations. The minimal-
ists showed that the migratory effects of environmental 
changes depend largely on economic, social, political, and 
demographic factors. As a recent report put it, “The range 
and complexity of the interactions between [environmental, 
economic, social, and political] drivers means that it will 
rarely be possible to distinguish individuals for whom 
environmental factors are the sole driver (‘environmental 
migrants’).”45
Although the maximalist school has had very little to 
respond to the minimalist critique, its ideas remain surpris-
ingly influential in public debate and in law and political 
science scholarship.46 Gemenne related this epistemological 
divide to different political objectives: accordingly, the max-
imalist “coalition” advocated for environmental protection, 
whereas the minimalist one focused on a notion of “protec-
tion.”47 As a first analysis, the maintained influence of the 
maximalist school, despite its essential flaws, reflects the 
discrepancy between the scientific accuracy of an academic 
argument and its success, especially in political debates.
Four Collective Norm Entrepreneurs
This fundamental opposition between two schools of 
thought is an important starting point, but it is insufficient 
for our present purpose. Some narratives do not easily fit 
within a strict dichotomy between the “alarmist” and the 
“skeptical” coalitions. In one of the few sociological analyses 
of the debate, Vlassopoulou identified three sectors: to the 
“asylum” and “environmental” that correspond broadly to 
the two schools of thoughts, she added the “humanitarian” 
sector, which approaches environmental migration as part 
of the governance of natural disasters.48
I argue that four broad normative enterprises can be 
distinguished. They relate to (1) international assistance, 
(2) the protection of forced migrants, (3) environmental 
sustainability, and (4) international security. At the risk of 
oversimplifying the question, it might be argued that the 
first two projects elaborate on the skeptical views, whereas 
the last two groups rather follow the assumptions of the 
alarmist school. There are significant contentions within 
each normative enterprise, but I argue that each group of 
advocates is broadly united by a common goal, a common 
language and culture, a similar way of framing environ-
mental migration as a governance issue, and overall a com-
parable argument. Each of these groups of advocates can be 
analyzed as a roughly coherent norm entrepreneur.
These normative enterprises pre-existed the discourse 
on environmental migration: in each case, environmental 
migration is a flagship rather than an ultimate goal. In other 
words, environmental migration is an intermediary step to 
grander projects—a strategic symbolic position from which 
each norm entrepreneur would dominate other argumenta-
tive battlefields. 
The first enterprise promotes norms on international 
assistance. Leading institutions include UN agencies 
(e.g., UNDP),49 international development agencies (e.g., 
World Bank, Asian Development Bank),50 as well as mul-
tiple NGOs (e.g., CARE, Christian Aid).51 They approach 
environmental migration through the notions of “disaster” 
and “human vulnerability,” adopting languages of rights 
and development, but also more specifically of “disaster 
risk-reduction” and “resilience.” This is concededly a broad 
group of heterogeneous agents, with significant differences 
in particular between the purely humanitarian actors and 
those working on development activities. However, those 
two fields have significant overlaps. In particular, as Minn 
notes, both “entail relationships between individuals and 
institutions in wealthy and impoverished countries, and 
have developed sizable infrastructures to facilitate these 
relationships and the processes that emerge from them.”52 
Both frame “environmental migration” as a “disaster,” 
although humanitarianism aims at responding to urgent 
needs following a disaster, whereas development aims at 
reducing the risk of, or recovering from, such a disaster. 
The need to coordinate humanitarian assistance and aid to 
development is well recognized.
The second normative enterprise promotes the protection 
of forced migrants. Its advocates feature in particular many 
academics (e.g., Alexander Betts, Stephen Castles, Graeme 
Hugo, Jane McAdam) and two international institutions 
(UNHCR and IOM). Here, the discourse on “environ-
mental” or “climate refugees” follows and greatly reinforces 
previous arguments for the protection of “economic refu-
gees.” The argument revolves around the analogy between 
environmentally induced forced migrants and refugees as 
people in need of international protection.
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The third normative enterprise promotes the impera-
tive of environmental sustainability. It puts together aca-
demics (e.g., Frank Biermann and Ingrid Boas, Norman 
Myers), environmental NGOs (e.g., Environmental Justice 
Foundation,53 Equity BD), and some international institu-
tions (UNEP, UNFCCC), with a support of some developing 
states (in particular AOSIS). These actors are interested 
mostly in the roots of environmental migration, either in 
terms of environmental protection (climate change mitiga-
tion) or of human resilience (climate change adaptation in 
situ). In fact, this normative enterprise often focuses on “cli-
mate migration” as a sub-issue circumscribed to instances 
of environmental migration that are attributed to anthropo-
genic global environmental change. It builds on “respon-
sibility” and “climate justice,” from which a duty to cease 
the harming conduct and to repair the injuries is inferred.
Lastly, the fourth normative enterprise promotes the 
reinforcement of national defence capabilities broadly 
understood, ranging from the military to border-control 
technologies, intelligence, etc. Its advocates are mainly 
members of the traditional security community (e.g., CAN 
Corporation, Jane’s Information Group),54 international 
institutions (e.g., the Security Council),55 think tanks and 
researchers,56 influential national institutions, and some 
industrial lobbies.57 Arguing that environmental migration 
may give rise to illegal migration, international criminal-
ity, terrorism, and conflicts, these actors call for prevent-
ive action, including investment in strategic partnerships 
with transit countries, border-control technologies, and 
reinforcement of military presence overseas.58
Constructing Identities, Roles, and Interests
Environmental migrants do not take an active role in any of 
the four collective normative enterprises. Yet their absence 
from the debate often goes remarkably unremarked.59 Even 
within their own states, environmental migrants hardly 
have any impact on the political agenda.60 This can be 
explained by what Crawford calls the “barrier of simple par-
ticipation”: as she notes, “The poor cannot be heard unless 
the media or the powerful publicize their arguments.”61 
Precisely: empirical studies show that environmental 
inducement to migration affects in particular the poor, who 
are less resilient and often more exposed to environmental 
changes.62 Furthermore, environmental migrants lack a 
collective identity, prerequisite to any political existence 
as a group. “Environmental migrants” do not exist as any-
thing approaching a socially constituted group that could 
have its voice heard; in fact, it must be rehearsed, and it is 
often impossible even “to distinguish individuals for whom 
environmental factors are the sole driver.”63
This absence of those most directly concerned by the 
debate raises moral issues,64 all the more because it contrib-
utes significantly to framing the debate: for whose benefit 
are the arguments on environmental migration developed? 
The identity of “environmental migrants” has not come from 
below: it has been imposed from above. The definition of 
this identity is an instance of competition amongst the four 
normative enterprises.65 Each narrative is based on a differ-
ent construction of “environmental migration,” but in each 
case this figure is imagined in opposition from “us.” Such 
dichotomies strive only because the “others” are voiceless. 
The first three collective norm entrepreneurs claim that they 
speak on behalf of environmental migrants, as they claim to 
emphasize respectively their need for norms institutionaliz-
ing international solidarity, their need for norms protecting 
all forced migrants, and their need for norms responding to 
climate change. The last collective norm entrepreneur con-
structs “environmental migrants” as at least potentially an 
enemy. 
Firstly, the humanitarian normative enterprise construes 
a relation between the mighty, valiant saviours and the vul-
nerable, passive others presumably waiting to be saved. The 
success of the narrative in framing an argument depends on 
the strength of empathy, stemming from the perception of 
a link of kinship between the interlocutor and the “victims.” 
Thus, Strömberg shows that “donors … give more to coun-
tries that lie closer, and with which they share a common 
language and colonial ties.”66 One of the greatest examples 
of massive donations, however, relates to the responses 
to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, where the emotional 
argument was supported by the immediate availability 
of dramatic images, the fact that the places affected were 
often touristic destinations, and the disappearance of many 
European tourists among the victims.67
Secondly, the forced migration normative enterprise fol-
lows an approach similar to the humanitarian dichotomy 
between the saviour and those in need of being saved, but 
it also builds on deep-rooted emotional attachment to the 
place as an element of identity. It opposes “our” space, seen 
as a safe haven and a potential place of asylum, to “their” 
space as inherently troublous. Psychological works on iden-
tity building have amply reflected on the role of place in 
individual identity building—in particular “home,” con-
ceived either as “a fortress to be defended” (against invad-
ers) or as “an expression of the self” (to the other);68 and 
the social dynamic at work here seems to build on the same 
element. Because of the importance given to the place, the 
forced migration argument is successful mainly in the West 
when it deals with immigration from the Third World: 
environmental migrants are conceived as destitute indi-
viduals fleeing collapsing socio-environmental systems 
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and heading toward “our” sanctuary. On the other hand, 
the narrative does not apply successfully to South-South 
or North-North migration: the former is frequently over-
looked,69 whereas the latter tends to be framed in humani-
tarian rather than migratory terms. George W. Bush offered 
an excellent illustration to the geographical rootedness of 
this argument when he argued that the New Orleanians dis-
placed at the time of hurricane Katrina were not “refugees” 
but “Americans” who “need[ed] the help and love and com-
passion of our fellow citizens.”70 Because displacement was 
happening within “our” space, Bush felt an urge to reframe 
the issue in terms of humanitarian assistance rather than 
forced migration. 
Thirdly, the environmentalist enterprise grounds its 
argument in a dichotomy between the “wrongdoers” and the 
“victims.” Except for a few instances related to the environ-
mental impact of development projects,71 the discourse 
applies mainly to issues of climate justice. Environmental 
or climate migrants are conceived as passive individuals, 
“forced … to leave their villages and cities to seek refuge 
in other areas.”72 Here, however, the link between “us” 
and “them” is stronger as the plight of the environmental 
migrants is attributed to the Western way of life (and some-
times to its imposition on emerging economies). Yet “cli-
mate migrants” remain fundamentally the figure of the 
other in an asymmetrically globalized world. In much of 
the environmentalist literature, “climate migrants” are 
described as faceless numbers, generally a number of mil-
lions. Jacobson, a pioneer of this approach, argued in 1988 
that “the rising number of environmental refugees is the 
best available measure of changes in the Earth’s physical 
conditions.”73 Thus, the environmentalist enterprise deals 
with “climate refugees” as a symptom—the “canary in the 
coalmine”—and their numbers as a measure: “climate refu-
gees” are a concern only inasmuch as their plight preludes 
and announces ours.74 Yet, despite their reification and 
their passiveness, “climate refugees” may also be a threat: 
the holders of large claims against the Western world, uni-
fied by solid moral arguments—a sword of Damocles hang-
ing over “us.” Already, developing countries have started 
rising up and claiming that developed states have to “rec-
ognize and commit to honor their climate debt in all its 
dimensions, … including through … being accountable for 
the hundreds of millions of people that will have to migrate 
as a result of climate change and to remove their restrictive 
policies on migration.”75 
Lastly, the normative enterprise on international secur-
ity reverses the roles: it construes “environmental refugees” 
as a threat. Accordingly, it is because “they” are poor and 
desperate individuals that “they” are also dangerous; it is 
because “we” are developed and open societies that we are 
vulnerable to them. The causes of migration do not matter 
as much as the growing numbers of increasingly desperate 
“climate Barbarians at the gates.”76 The argument is deep-
rooted in a latency of xenophobia and racialization.77 In 
contrast with the environmentalist argument, the secur-
ity enterprise submits that environmental migrants are so 
dangerous that defending ourselves against the “victims-
turned-villains”78 has become a necessary step. 
The Individual Prospects of Four Collective Norm 
Entrepreneurs
Which normative enterprise is most likely to succeed? This 
section assesses the prospects of each enterprise. It identi-
fies extrinsic factors79 such as the credibility of collective 
norm entrepreneurs, the possible emotional engagement 
of the interlocutors, and the role that domestic and inter-
national institutions can play in facilitating the discourse. It 
also discusses intrinsic elements such as the comprehensi-
bility of the message and its capacity to fit within dominant 
representations.
Humanitarian Assistance
The first argument relies on what Fassin called “moral senti-
ments,” which he defined as “the motions that direct our 
attention to the suffering of others and make us want to 
remedy them.”80 Such moral sentiments are arguably inher-
ent to human nature and pre-exist any ethical reflection.81 
Whereas neither ethics nor moral sentiments are able to 
determine global politics alone, they certainly have an influ-
ence. Humanitarian actors have high prestige, from which 
credibility ensues.
Yet humanitarianism has also been challenged. Some 
have highlighted the danger of reifying the beneficiaries 
of international aid. Thus, for Fassin, “the very gesture that 
appears to grant them recognition reduces them to what 
they are not—and often refuse to be—by reifying their con-
dition of victimhood while ignoring their history and mut-
ing their words.”82 Others have highlighted the insufficien-
cies of humanitarianism. In particular, David Rieff reflects a 
widespread sentiment that “no century has had better norms 
and worse realities.”83 He argues that, through humanitar-
ianism, “the modern conscience is … allowed to delegate 
its guilt and its anxiety to the designated consciences of the 
world of relief, development and human rights.”84
Humanitarianism surely is not a panacea. It might be best 
conceived as a cosmetic treatment rather than a substantive 
cure of the world’s ills. Whereas acute humanitarian crises 
may trigger the commitment of substantial resources, Rudi 
Muhammad Rizki, the former UN independent expert on 
human rights and international solidarity, identified “a 
large gap between assertions of international solidarity in 
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theory and their reflection in practice.” He added, “The fact 
that more than 1 billion people suffer from poverty and 
hunger is an indicator that, as the human race, we are fail-
ing to live as one family.”85
So far, humanitarian advocates have been able to gather 
large funds to respond to a natural disaster, but they have 
been less successful in triggering resources for long-term 
policies. The success of normative arguments has been cir-
cumscribed to a clarification of state obligations vis-à-vis 
their own populations and to some technical discussions 
relating in particular to the right of a state to intervene in 
another state.86 Yet there is little prospect for a broader nor-
mative framework, such as one defining state obligations 
toward the populations of other states. The humanitarian 
argument is simple, clear, and based on sound ethics, but 
it is too broad and not be sufficiently specific to have a sub-
stantial impact. A full realization of the humanitarian argu-
ment would require structural changes for which we might 
not yet be ready.
Forced Migration
Whereas the humanitarian argument is in a sense “too big 
to succeed,” the second argument focuses on forms of vul-
nerability specifically linked to forced displacement. The 
refugee regime provides these norm entrepreneurs with an 
essential organizational platform: the UNHCR. Although 
it does not have a specific mandate for protection, the IOM 
has also been involved in some research and advocacy. Both 
international organizations are recognized as strong moral 
authorities.
The refugee regime is also a common lifeworld upon 
which norm entrepreneurs have often tried to elaborate 
their argument. They have done so generally either through 
an explicit analogy through the notion of “environmental 
refugees,” or through proposals for “stretching” the refugee 
regime to other forms of “survival migration.”87 However, 
the influence of the protection of refugees extends well 
beyond explicit analogies. Crawford argues that previous 
ideas may affect later ones in at least three other ways: “as 
the background discourse; as the organizing principle of 
institutions and social structures; and through their asso-
ciation with feelings.”88 Even when not explicitly compared, 
“environmental migrants” are usually conceived on the 
background of the international refugee regime: this may 
explain the extraordinary resistance to ideas of multi-caus-
ality (persecution being conceived as a unique and direct 
drive for displacement), but also the constant emphasis on 
international migrants.89
However, a hurdle to the analogy (be it implicit or explicit) 
stems from challenges to the international refugee protec-
tion. State practice increasingly deviates from the norm, 
and some of the states most affected by climate change are 
not parties to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees.90 In this context, UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees António Guterres and the UNHCR warn that 
redefining environmental migrants as “refugees” “could 
undermine the international protection regime.”91 If this 
might follow sound political grounds, the position is not 
necessarily ethically sound: supposing that refugees and 
“environmental migrants” are in a similar situation and that 
the amount of generosity is fixed, there is no reason to con-
centrate all these resources to the sole refugees.
The limit of the rational argument is where the emo-
tional argument develops. There is no essential reason why 
the migrants should be protected rather than other vul-
nerable people—and the skeptical school has shown that 
those most vulnerable were often unable to move for lack 
of resources.92 Yet, among other forms of human sufferings, 
migration attracts a specific attention that is linked to a 
deep-rooted fear of invaders. Hathaway demonstrated that 
the institutionalization of the refugee regime was triggered 
by “neither a humanitarian nor a human rights vision,” but 
rather by “the pursuit by states of their own well-being”—
an attempt at “govern[ing] disruptions of regulated inter-
national migration in accordance with the interests of 
states.”93 Yet if regulating international peace and security 
is the main motivation of critical states, forced migration 
norm entrepreneurs are opposed to the securitization of the 
issue: they assume that the outcome of securitization would 
not benefit forced migrants. As Castles notes, an alarmist 
discourse would “tend to reinforce existing negative images 
of refugees as a threat to the security, prosperity and public 
health of rich countries in the global North.”94
On the other hand, however, there is little prospect for a 
“skeptical” discourse that would build on complex causality, 
recognize the rarity of international migration, submit that 
“migration” is perfectly “normal” and does not “endanger” 
Western states, and pay attention to those who are unable 
to move because they lack the resources necessary to move. 
In terms of communication, such a message would presum-
ably remain perfectly inaudible for most of its interlocutors, 
not only because of its complexity and lack of emotional 
roots, but also because it situates the link environment-
migration outside of our lifeworld when, for instance, evad-
ing the dichotomy between forced and voluntary migration 
or when calling for holistic development policies. Such a 
message would lead to a situation where, as Crawford puts 
it, “the words may be heard, but because of their different 
Weltanshung [Weltanschauung], interlocutors find they are 
incomprehensible to each other. Thus, those with power 
will not hear or even consciously exclude those who do not 
speak in the terms of the dominant discourse.”95
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Stuck in a dilemma between an alarmist narrative that 
risks being diverted by security actors and a feeble discourse 
that does not fit into the dominant lifeworld, forced migra-
tion advocates have had a hard time finding their place in 
the environmental migration debate. As a result, they have 
often developed a halfway, “neither-nor” approach, denoun-
cing the notion of “environmental migration” in introduc-
tory considerations yet immediately leaving these remarks 
aside.96 Nicholson identified this “ontological contradiction” 
in the academic literature: “There will be an acknowledge-
ment that the ‘drivers’ of migration are always complex, and 
that all migration is conditioned by myriad contingencies 
and ‘geo-social-political context.’ Yet the same authors will 
often then continue to refer to ‘climate displacement’ as if 
it were an essential category.”97 In terms of protection, the 
concept of “environmental migration” is both impractical 
and irrelevant. Yet the advocates of forced migration could 
not but attempt to use the environmental migration debate 
to pursue further goals.
Environmental Sustainability
At first sight, the environmentalist normative enterprise 
appears quite promising. The call for adapting inter-
national governance to a new issue and the framing of 
this issue as a matter of responsibility touch deep-rooted, 
largely shared ethical principles. There is a strong scientific 
argument: experts overwhelmingly agree on the reality of 
global, anthropogenic climate change.98 Besides, there are 
strong institutions. The 1992 UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, with 195 parties, is one of the most 
widely ratified treaties. The issue attracts great attention 
globally, as the large “COPs” (Conferences of the Parties) 
gather tens of thousands of environmental activists and 
journalists each year. Responsibility is also recognized in 
international law, at least when a state is responsible for the 
“serious consequences” that its conduct could cause to other 
states.99 Attaching “environmental migration” to climate 
change might therefore look like a powerful argumentative 
strategy.
Yet there are four significant obstacles to the success of 
this argument. Firstly, the application of the argument is 
inconsistent with its ethical basis. Responsibility for climate 
change pleads for “compensation”—unconditional financial 
flows from those states “responsible” for climate change and 
those “affected” by it. This is roughly the approach followed 
by negotiations on loss and damages. Yet a corrective justice 
argument does not seem able to justify a centralized govern-
ance of climate migration, which would further curtail the 
sovereignty of the “injured” states. Responsibility does not 
justify interference.
Secondly, studies in the sociology of media on climate 
change show a tendency to over-represent skeptical claims 
over more serious scientific arguments, for the sake of what 
Boykoff and Boykoff call “adherence to first-order journalis-
tic norms—personalization, dramatization, and novelty.”100 
In another article, the same authors recall that industrial 
lobbies may also play a role in favouring skeptical claims 
to avoid costly mitigation measures, thus struggling against 
the scientific basis of the argument.101 These factors explain 
that climate change denial remains influential, in particu-
lar in American media, despite the absence of any scientific 
support.
Thirdly, other authors have identified a gap between a 
cold scientific argument and its emotional perception—
what Collins and Evans called “science’s … short-term pol-
itical impotence.”102 Thus, Leiserowitz showed that, “while 
large majorities of Americans believe climate change is real 
and consider it a serious problem, it remains a low prior-
ity relative to other national and environmental issues”: it 
“lacks a sense of urgency.”103 Leiserowitz and other psychol-
ogists explain that this is due to a gap in perception: whereas 
climate change–related risks are viewed as affecting mostly 
“people and places far distant in space and time,” the costs 
of potential response policies are immediately tangible.104 
In this context, individuals are tempted to “erect barriers 
to their personal commitment” to the issue, despite—or 
because—of their anxiety.105 Too much of an alarmist dis-
course could thus favour policies that do not aim at avoiding, 
but rather at protecting ourselves against, climate change–
induced migration—thus benefitting the fourth collective 
norm entrepreneurs. 
Fourthly, although the ethical bases of the argument are 
relatively simple, environmental advocates fail to prescribe 
any simple solution. According to Williams, the absence of 
simple and efficient “packageable solutions” impedes the 
success of the scientific argument.106 Furthermore, Hulme 
is concerned that “climate change is not making sense to 
us.”107 Hulme denounces the domination of a “purely 
physical reading of climate change”108 that strips the dis-
course from “their constitutive human values and cultural 
meanings.”109 As a consequence, he argues, “climate change 
becomes a malleable envoy enlisted in support of too many 
rulers.”110 In a commentary on a proposal for a “climate refu-
gee” convention, Hulme similarly expressed concerns over 
delegating “the fate of millions” to “some distant UN com-
mittee” that would oversee the “social dynamic of change in 
which multiple values and power relations are at work.”111 
If the protection of environmental migrants is really what 
environmentalists strive for, they will need to coalesce with 
forced migration pundits and take the skeptical approach 
into account; if they strive for raising awareness on the need 
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for greater environmental sustainability, the argument will 
suffer from their inability to propose a simple solution.
International Security
The foundations of the last argument are often denigrated 
by researchers112 with few exceptions. According to Elliott, 
for instance, “Claims about climate and environmental 
security, and about the security implications of climate 
migration, are … both empirically and conceptually 
fraught.”113 Despite this reception in the academic world, 
a larger audience often perceives security experts as cred-
ible norm entrepreneurs. The successful securitization of 
environmental migration reflects strong inequalities in the 
formation of public discourse. If it describes securitization 
as an “act of speech,” the Copenhagen school of security 
studies also shows that the “securitizing agents” must also 
secure an argument that would “achieve sufficient effect to 
make an audience tolerate violations of rules that would 
otherwise have to be obeyed.”114 The way environmental 
migration has been securitized reflects a strong ascend-
ency of Western norm entrepreneurs in the construction of 
environmental migration. The notion of a human security, 
as an attempt at displacing the emphasis from the receiv-
ing states to environmental migrants,115 has had only a very 
little influence.
Security pundits possess strong institutional support, in 
particular from interested industrial lobbies, and they have 
had access to critical organizational platforms, including 
the United Nations Security Council.116 Above all, they 
were able to deploy what the three other collective norm 
entrepreneurs lack: an efficient message. As White puts it, 
“Thinking in security terms is relatively easy.”117
The security argument is rooted in strong emotions—
fears—that compel immediate action. Here, the grounds for 
fear are diverse. A first layer of fears is xenophobic, some-
times racist; it relates to a “flood” of immigrants who would 
steal “our” jobs, confuse “our” national identity, or even 
perhaps bring violence or mix with “our” “race.” This mes-
sage is particularly efficient in the post-9/11 lifeworld, where 
migration is constantly associated with threats. Yet a second 
layer of fears relates to the touch of newness and uncertainty 
that “climate change” brings. Uncertainty and fears call for 
early precautionary measures. 
Moreover, unlike the three other collective norm entre-
preneurs, security norm entrepreneurs prescribe a solu-
tion that can be perceived as simple, realistic, and efficient. 
“Building fences against irregular migration is politically suc-
cessful,”118 White notes. It certainly is more politically suc-
cessful than funding humanitarian cooperation or climate 
change adaptation. Here again, the security discourse does 
not need epistemological accuracy to persuade key actors 
(governments and their constituencies) that derogations are 
justified in the face of migration and that military spending 
must be increased. This success is in spite of the gap, that 
Elliott highlights, between the “image of processes that are 
likely to be out of control and therefore highly threatening” 
in the security literature and empirical evidence that “slow-
induced migration is the more likely outcome in the context 
of climate change.”119 The international security enterprise 
is misleading,120 but, in terms of communication, it is also a 
particularly powerful argument that multiplies the fears of 
migration by the uncertainties of climate change. 
The Prospects of a Disputed Issue
This article is a first attempt at applying constructivist 
theories to the normative debate on environmental migra-
tion. It identifies one methodological difficulty: the exist-
ence of four distinct collective norm entrepreneurs, for 
whom environmental migration is only an intermediary 
step toward different ultimate goals. The existing theor-
etical frame focuses on norm entrepreneurship by either a 
unique actor,121 or a set of actors sharing a unique goal,122 
who combat inert bureaucracies, all things being equal. 
Here, however, applying these theories prospectively to the 
issue of environmental migration shows that different norm 
entrepreneurs concurrently frame environmental migra-
tion as an issue: they speak to the interlocutors with similar 
words, but their messages differ.
These norm entrepreneurs cannot but interact with one 
another. This is not only because normative enterprises gen-
erally struggle for public attention in what may appear as 
a finite pool of worries,123 but all the more because, with 
regard to environmental migration, they compete on the 
same conceptual grounds. The reception of a message 
depends on its understanding by the interlocutor, which is 
framed partly by the previous reception of other messages. 
The four collective norm entrepreneurs identified here write 
different stories, but on the same support, with the risk that 
the audience may amalgamate all four narratives into a 
somewhat confused understanding.
The prospects of a dispute issue can be analyzed only in 
relation to other such enterprises. The following remarks 
are a sketch for more thorough analyses of such complex 
interactions. Four conclusions can be suggested.
Firstly, as to the representation of environmental migra-
tion, the maximalist (environmentalist and security) and 
minimalist (humanitarian and forced migration) enter-
prises are in direct epistemological contradiction: neither of 
them can fully succeed unless it eliminates the other. The 
rational argument, backed by a host of empirical studies 
showing the complex linkages between environmental fac-
tors and migration, is obviously on the side of the skeptical 
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perspective. However, the alarmist representation consti-
tutes a simpler, more efficient message. Therefore, at least in 
the short term, the alarmist representation seems likely to 
maintain its ascendency in the political representations.124
Secondly, as to the nature of the argument, two 
approaches clash. For the humanitarian, forced migration, 
and environmentalist norm entrepreneurs, the disputed 
issue of environmental migration is before all an ethical one. 
For the security norm entrepreneurs, however, it is a ques-
tion of self-protection. These approaches are not necessarily 
incompatible, but there is a finite space available in the pub-
lic discourse, and one argument often takes attention away 
from the other. The two approaches call to different emo-
tions, respectively empathy and fears: once an audience has 
associated environmental migration with existential fears, 
it is doubtful that it may return to empathy. Because fear is a 
more urgent feeling, security norm entrepreneurs are likely 
to impose a self-protective approach over the ethical one. 
The securitization of environmental migration may signifi-
cantly impede ethical arguments because the discourse of 
animosity will interfere with the discourse of solidarity: the 
necessity of protecting “us” situates the debate beyond the 
realm of ethics: it outshines the desire to help “them.”
Thirdly, as to the scope of the argument, it might be 
assumed that actors will prefer an argument prescribing a 
solution perceived as cheaper, at least if the outcomes are 
perceived as similar. To that extent, the forced migration 
argument has an advantage over the broader humanitarian 
argument: it is more specific and focuses on the most vis-
ible part—the displaced. In other words, addressing forced 
migration has a better satisfaction-to-cost ratio: it gives us 
a better image of ourselves at a lesser price. This advantage, 
however, is not an absolute one. By denouncing “invisibil-
ity” and highlighting the “roots of the problem” (of dis-
placement), humanitarian advocates may successfully call 
for some attention to those “trapped in place.” Their pos-
ition will, however, remain subordinate to the forced migra-
tion argument, as it follows from the very structure of their 
argument—a comparison between visible migrants and 
invisible non-migrants.
Fourthly, as to the capacity of each normative enter-
prise to prescribe a solution perceived as simple and effi-
cient, the security argument certainly prevails over each 
of the other arguments. The humanitarian, forced migra-
tion, and environmentalist solutions are plagued by aid 
fatigue and more generally by the limits of our willingness 
to “give,” especially against a background of endless eco-
nomic crises. It also suffers from the difficulties of engaging 
in global cooperation, and, in the absence of such cooper-
ation, from the feeling that the aid brought by one isolated 
state would be a drop in the ocean of needs. In comparison, 
the solutions prescribed by security norm entrepreneurs are 
(wrongly) perceived as efficient and cheap.  As a matter of 
fact, it is profoundly disturbing to consider that the secur-
ity argument might benefit from the social dynamics raised 
by other norm entrepreneurs. The increasing denunciation 
for environmental migration as a humanitarian, migration, 
and climate-change crisis might thus end up reinforcing 
the security narrative, leading to a further securitization 
of migration and climate change, and harming the climate 
migrants more than anyone else. This diversion of social 
awareness is more likely when arguments are based on, or 
influenced by, a similar alarmist representation of environ-
mental migration.
Ultimately, the international security collective norm 
entrepreneur is likely to play the greatest role in defining 
possible solutions to environmental migration. Research 
and advocacy may continue to focus on other arguments, 
and these arguments might inflect policies, but the humani-
tarian, forced migration, and environmental arguments 
will not, on their own, define the global governance of 
environmental migration: they will remain subordinated to 
logics of fears and to their capacity to relate to the dominant 
discourse.
Conclusion
Wendt warned that, “if anything, structural change should 
be quite difficult.”125 Four normative enterprises competing 
on the same conceptual field do not make things any easier. 
If some change is certainly happening,126 it is unlikely that 
the fundamental limits to the governance of humanitarian 
assistance, forced migration, or environmental sustainabil-
ity will change as a result of the debate on environmental 
migration. In a world where migration is increasingly per-
ceived as a threat to national security rather than an incred-
ible opportunity for development and transcultural inter-
course, the cold analysis initiated in this article suggests that 
the security argument for the “management” of environ-
mental migration is most likely to succeed. With the aid of 
scholars, the advocates of humanitarian assistance, forced 
migration and environmental sustainability should reframe 
their argument in a language compatible with the security 
discourse, perhaps through concepts such as “human secur-
ity” or, more convincingly, “global interdependence.”
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